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Abstract
The large size of modern software systems has led to an increase in the complexity
of the interaction between a system's code, its input, and its output. I propose the
following classifications for the regions of a system's input:
* Critical control: data that influences the internal operation and output of the
system.
* Critical payload: data that heavily contributes to the output of the program
but does not substantially influence the internal operation of the program.
* Benign control: data that influences the internal operation of the system, but
does not contribute to the output of the system.
* Benign payload: data that neither contributes to the output nor substantially
influences the internal operation of the program.
In this thesis, I present Chaos, a system designed to automatically infer these
classifications for a program's inputs and code. Chaos monitors the execution trace
and dynamic taint trace of an application over a suite of inputs to determine how
regions of the programs's code and input influence its behavior and output. This thesis
demonstrates the accuracy of Chaos's classifications for a set of imaging applications
and their support libraries.
These automatically inferred classifications are relevant to a variety of software en-
gineering tasks, including program understanding, maintenance, debugging, testing,
and defect correction triage.
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Chapter 1
Introduct ion
A program's input often contains two kinds of data: control, which influences aspects
such as the invoked functionality or interpretation of subsequent parts of the input,
and payload, which contains the data that the program directly processes to generate
the output. In data container formats (e.g. image, audio, and video), control data
specifies meta-properties such as data layout, the type of compression algorithm, and
the dimensions of the output. Payload data, on the other hand, often manifests itself
as data processing parameters or the raw data for processing.
A program typically defines many precise invariants about the content of control
data. As the program processes these inputs, violations of these invariants can lead
to large, discontinuous changes in the behavior of the program. For instance, an
invalid piece of control data may cause the program to invoke incorrect functionality.
On the other hand, programs typically define few invariants about the content of
payload data. Because this data represents the raw, unprocessed output (e.g. an
image's contents), a program often has a similar behavior over the domain of possible
payload data values.
The difference between a program's behavioral sensitivity on control data versus
payload data suggests that some data is more critical to the behavior and output of
the program than other data. More specifically, a corruption to a critical piece of data
can make a program crash, invoke the wrong functionality, or produce a significantly
distorted output. On the other hand, a corruption to a benign piece of data can have
a relatively benign effect on the behavior and output of the program. For example,
a benign piece of data may affect a relatively small portion of the output, such as a
single pixel in an image. Therefore, a corruption of such data may lead to a small
amount of corruption in the output.
Although a program's behavioral sensitivity to a piece data may identify the data
as critical, it does not entirely identify every piece of critical data in a program's input.
For example, it may be the case that a large behavioral change represents logging or
other functionality that has a benign effect on the program's output. Additionally,
certain regions of payload data may have a larger contribution to the program's output
than other payload regions. For instance, a paletted image is an image in which each
pixel value is encoded as an index into a color palette table. Each entry in the color
palette table specifies an appropriate color value. In such images, a corruption of the
index for a single pixel will have a relatively benign effect on the output because only
that single pixel value will be corrupted. However, a corruption of the color palette
table will be critical because every pixel in the image makes a reference to this table.
These examples suggest that a particular piece of data can be separately identified
as either control or payload and also as critical or benign. This defines the following
ontology for a region of the input to a program:
* Critical control: data linked to behavioral changes that produce large changes
in the output. Structural information, such as embedded field sizes, are pieces of
critical control data because the program will be unable to continue processing
the input if the structural information is incorrect.
* Critical payload: data that heavily contributes to the output of the program
but does not substantially influence the behavior of the program. The color
palette table of a paletted image critically determines the quality of the final,
outputted image.
* Benign control: data linked to behavioral changes that produce little to no
changes in the output. Fields that designate the existence of irrelevant func-
tionality (i.e. embedded comments that indicate which software package created
the file) may change the observed behavior of the program, but these behavioral
changes have a benign effect on the program's output
* Benign payload: data that neither contributes to the output nor substan-
tially influences the behavior of the program. For uncompressed data, such as
raw images or plain text, localized changes to the input will produce localized
changes in the output. Further, such changes will not alter the behavior of the
program.
These data classifications are an artifact of the way a program uses a piece of data.
Because the behavior of a program is given by its source, these data classifications
correspond to pieces of code in the program.
* Initialization and Cleanup: Most applications have pieces of code that deal
with no part of the input. This code often handles initialization and cleanup of
global data structures.
* Parsing, Verification, Sanitation: Code associated with input parsing, ver-
ification, and sanitation will touch all types of input. This code will critically
determine the behavior and output of the application because the application
will reject inputs that violate structural or semantic constraints. Sanitation
code may be benign because it may implement techniques to cleanse an input
that violates structural or semantic constraints.
* Feature Sorting: Many binary container formats consist of a sequence of
commands. Each command is minimally specified by a type and command
length; the rest of the command specifies command-specifc data. An application
for such a format will first read a command and then use the command's type
to determine which piece of the functionality to invoke. The code that directs
commands to sub-components touches control data. This code is critical because
an error in these regions of code may cause the program to invoke the wrong
functionality. The code that implements each sub-component may be either
critical or benign. For example, some sub-components may be benign because
they implement functionality that has no effect on the output.
* Payload processing: Code that implements compression and decoding schemes
often touches the entirety of the payload data that the program uses to generate
an output. This type of code is critical to the output quality of the application
because it is responsible for generating the entire output. However, a program
may also contain benign pieces of code that generate only small portions of the
entire input.
These code distinctions give software developers a better understanding of their
system. Errors in control code and payload code typically manifest themselves as
distinct failures [28]. Errors in control code typically cause the program to diverge
dramatically from its desired behavior. Possible symptoms include the inability to
process the input at all or the invocation of the incorrect functionality. Errors in
payload code tend to be more subtle, typically an anomaly in the content as it is
presented to the user. Understanding this distinction can help developers more accu-
rately diagnose and eliminate program defects.
Developers often find themselves with more defects than they can reasonably at-
tempt to correct. Because, in general, defects in benign code tend to have less drastic
consequences on the overall execution than do defects in critical code, understanding
the differences between these two kinds of code and the roles they play in the system
can help developers make better decisions about which defects to fix first.
This thesis presents Chaos. Chaos gives developers an automated tool to infer
the control versus payload and critical versus benign distinctions of a program's code
and input. Given a program and an input, Chaos produces the following:
* Input Specification: It produces a chunking of bytes in the input to seman-
tically grouped fields.
* Input Classification: It produces, for each field of the input specification, a
classification of whether the field is control or payload and critical or benign.
* Code Classification: It produces, for each executed block of source code, a
classification of whether the block is control or payload, critical or benign, or a
mixture of classifications.
Chaos first uses automated input specification inference to produce a mapping
from input bytes, to semantic fields. Chaos then uses automated, directed fuzzing to
explore the behavior of the program. By observing how drastically the behavior of
the system changes as a result of a change to an input field, Chaos determines if the
field is control or payload. By analyzing how much the program's output depends
on each field, Chaos determines if a field is critical or benign. After Chaos classifies
each field in the input, it uses dynamic taint tracing to identify which code blocks
reference which fields. Chaos produces a classification for each block by aggregating
the classifications for the fields each block references.
This thesis makes the following contributions:
* Concept: This thesis proposes and explores the concept that control versus
payload and critical versus benign distinctions for data and code represent a
productive classification in current software development practices.
* Technique: This thesis presents Chaos, a novel system designed to automati-
cally infer the control versus payload and the critical versus benign distinctions
for a program's input and code. Chaos uses execution monitoring, dynamic
taint tracing, automatic input specification inference, and behavioral distance
measurement to produce its classifications.
* Results: This thesis gives a detailed analysis of the quality Chaos's classifi-
cations by discussing how they correspond to the design and implementation of
real programs.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the components in Chaos's design. Chapter 4
describes, in detail, the design and implementation of each of Chaos's components.
Chapter 5 provides an experimental evaluation of the quality and applicability of
Chaos's classifications. Chapter 6 discusses the related work.
Chapter 2
Motivation
This chapter uses an example application and file format to motivate the utility and
design of Chaos.
Figure 2-1 gives an abbreviated specification of the Portable Network Graphics
(PNG) file format [1]. PNG is a popular image format that many image viewers, web
browsers, and image manipulation tools support.
Every PNG file begins with a fixed sized header and continues with an arbitrary
number of variable-length data chunks. A predetermined, fixed-format chunk ends
the list of chunks. I have omitted this chunk from Figure 2-1 for brevity. The file
header contains the data required to load a basic PNG file. The first seven bytes of
the header contain a magic constant that identifies the file as a PNG image. The rest
of the header contains the image's height, width, and encoding type.
Each additional chunk specifies new information about the contents of the image.
At the very least, each chunk provides its length, a tag indicating the type of the
chunk, and a checksum that ensures the integrity of the chunk's data. These fields
allow an application to navigate an entire file without knowing the exact layout of
every chunk. The structure of the rest of the chunk is specific to the data that the
chunk contains.
The time chunk provides a timestamp for the creation date of the image. The
gamma chunk indicates to the image renderer that gamma correction needs to be
applied to the image. Gamma correction transforms the luminance of each pixel
in an image in accordance with a given gamma parameter. The final data chunk
contains the compressed picture content of the image.
The official reference implementation for loading PNG images, libpng, encom-
passes some 25KLOC. There are a number of situations in which a libpng developer
may want to better understand how the libpng system behaves. For instance, a new
developer, charged with implementing a new feature, may want to understand how the
existing behaviors of a 25KLOC system interact with the desired behavior required
to implement the new feature. In this scenario, there are a number of properties of
the system and its input that could help the developer understand how to implement
the new feature.
* Specification: Given a binary input, the developer may want to know which
bytes of the input belong to the same semantic field. For instance, the developer
may want to know that bytes 30-34 represent the length field of the time chunk.
* Input Localization: Given an input specification, the developer may want to
know which functions manipulate which fields of the specification. For example,
the developer may want to know that the png_set_time function processes the
value of the time chunk.
* Criticality: Given an input specification, the developer may want to know
which fields determine the behavior and output of the application. For example,
the developer may want to know that the checksum embedded in the header
chunk must match the checksum of the header chunk data that the png_crc32
function computes. If the checksums do not match, the library will not attempt
to load the rest of the input. Therefore, the checksum embedded in the header
is critical to the behavior and output of the application. On the other hand, if
the checksum embedded in the gamma does not match its computed checksum,
then the library will still attempt to load the rest of the input. Therefore, the
checksum of the gamma chunk has a benign effect on the behavior and output
of the application.
struct png {
struct header {
char magic[] = {0x89, Ox50, ...};
int width;
int height;
byte interlacing;
int crc;
struct time {
int length;
char tag[] = "tIME";
int value;
int crc;
}
struct gamma {
int length;
char tag[] = "gAMA";
int gamma;
int crc;
}
struct data {
int length;
char tag[] = "IDAT";
byte data[length - 8];
int crc;
}
Figure 2-1: An abbreviated specification of the Portable Network Graphics file format
Chaos provides developers with a set of components that will automatically infer
these properties for an application and its input.
* Input Specification Generator: determines the structure of semantic fields in a
binary input.
* Field Classifier: classifies each field in the specification as control (i.e. the
field influences the behavior of the application) or payload (i.e. the field does
not influence the behavior of the application). The Field Classifier also classifies
each field as critical (i.e. the field substantially influences the behavior or output
of the application) or benign (i.e. the field does not substantially influence the
behavior or output of the application).
* Code Classifier: determines, for each basic block in the program's code, which
fields in the input that the block references. The Code Classifier also classifies
each basic block as either control or payload and either critical or benign.
ii_;
Chapter 3
System Design
Figure 3-1 depicts Chaos's high-level design. Chaos is composed of an Execution
Monitor that monitors the behavior the application, an Input Specification Genera-
tor that produces a structural specification of the input, a Fuzzer that explores the
behavior of the application as it responds to changes to its input, a Field Classifier
that produces classifications for the application's input fields, and a Code classifier
that produces classifications for the application's code.
3.1 Execution Monitor
Figure 3-2 depicts the inputs and outputs of the Execution Monitor. The Execution
Monitor takes an application and a test input. The Execution Monitor runs the
application on the input and records the application's execution trace and dynamic
taint trace.
* Execution Trace. The execution trace of an application is the sequence of
function call and branch instructions executed during the run of the program.
Each entry in the execution trace contains a reference to the executed function
call or branch instruction and reference to the function or basic block to which
control flow transfered.
program input
input specifcation field classifications code classifications
Figure 3-1: System design
program input
execution dynamic taint
trace trace
Figure 3-2: Execution Monitor
* Dynamic Taint Trace. The dynamic taint trace of an application is the
sequence of executed instructions that were affected by the input. Each entry
in the dynamic taint trace contains a reference to the executed instruction and
the list of input bytes that affected the instruction.
3.2 Input Specification Generator
Figure 3-3 depicts the inputs and output of the Input Specification Generator. The
Input Specification Generator groups consecutive bytes of the application's input
into fields. The Input Specification Generator first uses the dynamic taint trace to
dynamic taint
trace
input specification
Figure 3-3: Input Specification Generator
determine which instructions each byte of the input affects. The Input Specification
Generator then groups fields according to the heuristic that bytes that are adjacent
in the input and affect the same operations in the application are in the same field.
3.3 Fuzzer
program
input
specification input
perturbed trace
suite
Figure 3-4: Fuzzer
Figure 3-4 depicts the inputs and outputs of the Fuzzer. The Fuzzer provides
Chaos with a means to explore the behaviors of the application on a suite of inputs
that are similar to the original input. The Fuzzer generates a new, randomly fuzzed
input for each field in the input specification. More specifically, each perturbed input
is the same as the original input except for the value of a single field. The Fuzzer
uses the Execution Monitor to record the execution trace of the application as it runs
over each perturbed input; this produces a suite of perturbed execution traces.
3.4 Field Classifier:
dynamic taint
trace
execution peturbed trace
trace suite
Field Classifier
field
classifications
Figure 3-5: Field Classifier
Figure 3-5 depicts the inputs and outputs of the Field Classifier. The Field Clas-
sifier classifies each field of the input specification as either control or payload and
either critical or benign. The Field Classifier uses behavioral distance and output
dependence to compute its classification for a field.
* Behavioral Distance: The behavioral distance describes how similar one ex-
ecution is to another. A behavioral distance of 0 means that both runs of the
application executed the exact same functionality. A behavioral distance of 1
means that each run of the application executed entirely different pieces of func-
tionality. The Field Classifier compares the execution of the program on the
unperturbed input to each perturbed execution by computing the behavioral
distance between their two execution traces. Because the Fuzzer creates each
perturbed execution by changing a single field of the input, the Field Classifier
assigns the behavioral distance of a perturbed execution to the field associated
with that execution.
The Field Classifier clusters all the behavioral distances observed among the
fields into two clusters. The first cluster consists of all fields that have a be-
havioral distance close to 0 (i.e. close to the original execution); these fields
are given a payload classification. The fields in the second cluster are those
with a large behavioral distance; these fields are labeled as critical control. As
discussed in Section 5.4, Chaos labels all control fields as critical.
e Output Dependence: The Field Classifier inspects the dynamic taint trace
of the original, unperturbed execution to compute a field's output dependence.
The output dependence of a field is the percentage of the operations involved
in the computation of the output that are affected by the field.
The Field Classifier uses output dependence to determine if a payload field is
critical or benign. If a field has an output dependence greater than .1 (i.e. it
affects 10% or more of the operations involved in computing the output), then
the Field Classifier classifies the field as critical. Otherwise, the Field Classifier
classifies the field as benign.
3.5 Code Classifier
dynamic taint field
trace classifications
Code Classifier
code
classifications
Figure 3-6: Code Classifier
Figure 3-6 depicts the inputs and outputs of the Code Classifier. The Code Clas-
sifier uses the Field Classifier's results to compute a classification for each executed
block in the application. The Code Classifier inspects the dynamic taint trace from
the execution of the application on the unperturbed input to determine which basic
blocks reference which fields of the input. For each basic block, the Code Classifier
collects the classification for each field that the basic block references. The Code
Classifier then assigns the basic block the classification that occurs most frequently
among its fields. Basic blocks that do not have a single, dominant classification are
reported as mixed usage.
Chapter 4
Implementation
As discussed in Chapter 3, Chaos consists of an Execution Monitor, an Input Spec-
ification Generator, a Fuzzer, a Field Classifier, and a Code classifier. This chapter
discusses the design and implementation of each component.
4.1 Execution Monitor
As described in Section 3.1, the Execution Monitor records an application's execution
trace and dynamic taint trace while the application runs on an input. Chaos uses
the execution trace to compute the behavioral distance between two executions of the
application on two similar inputs. Chaos uses the dynamic taint trace to generate the
input specification, determine output dependence, and to classify basic blocks in the
application's source. Each trace can be viewed as a sequence of events where each
event corresponds to an executed instruction. Section 4.1.1 discusses the individual
events in the execution trace and Section 4.1.2 discusses the individual events in
the dynamic taint trace. Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 discuss the Execution Monitor's
implementation.
4.1.1 Execution Trace
There are a number of ways in which one can represent an application's execution
trace. For example, one can describe the execution trace as a set or a sequence of
executed modules, functions, basic blocks, or branches. I have chosen to represent the
execution trace by the sequence of executed functions and branches. The execution
trace consists of the following events:
* Function call: A function call event corresponds to the execution of a function
call instruction. The event records the function invoked by the instruction.
* Branch: A branch event corresponds to the execution of a branch instruction.
The event records the basic block to which the instruction jumped.
These two different events allow Chaos to inspect the both the coarse (function
call) and fine (branch) behaviors of an application.
4.1.2 Dynamic Taint Trace
Most dynamic taint tracing implementations only track enough information to de-
termine whether or whether not an external source of input taints an operation in
the execution of a program [24, 29, 10, 27, 17]. These taint tracing implementations
assign a single boolean value to each operation in the program. Chaos, on the other
hand, requires more precise information. Chaos's Input Specification Generator and
Code Classifier need to be able determine which inputs and which offsets of those
inputs affect an operation. To support this, the Execution Monitor associates the
output of each operation in the program with a taint item. A taint item identifies a
collection of inputs and offsets into those inputs. During the execution of an appli-
cation, the Execution Monitor can associate an operation's output with one of the
following taint items:
* Taint Object: a source of input to the application. A taint object is given by a
string that names the origin of the object. In the case of a file, this string is the
name of the file. In general, a taint object can be a file, a socket, or a memory
buffer.
* Taint Tag: an offset into a taint object. A taint tag is given by a reference to
a taint object and an integer that indicates the offset into the taint object.
* Taint Range: a range of offsets into a taint object. A taint range is given by
a reference to a taint object and two integers that indicate the beginning and
the end of the range of offsets. A single taint range more efficiently represents
a large collection of contiguous offsets than a collection of taint tags.
* Taint Set: a union of taint objects, tags, ranges, or other taint sets. A taint set
is given by a list of references to its constituent taint items.
Each event in the dynamic taint trace consists of a taint item and a reference to
the operation in the program for which the Execution Monitor generated the taint
item. Section 4.1.3 describes how the Execution Monitor creates and manages taint
items for each operation in the program.
4.1.3 Instrumentor
Without hardware support for execution monitoring or dynamic taint tracing, the
Execution Monitor must instrument the source or binary of the application with
additional code that generates the execution trace and dynamic trace.
I implemented a static source code instrumentor built on top of the Low Level
Virtual Machine (LLVM) compiler infrastructure [18]. LLVM provides a language
and platform independent Intermediate Representation (IR), an introspection library,
and an extensible compiler that makes it possible to easily manipulate and generate
native code for applications compiled to the LLVM IR. Though Chaos's workflow
currently relies on having the source of an application, the instrumentor could target
any language, including assembly language, for which an LLVM IR translator exists.
The LLVM project currently provides translators for x86 assembly, C, C++, Microsoft
Intermediate Language (MSIL), Java bytecode, Fortran, and Ada.
The instrumentor modifies the source of the application to produce a new, in-
strumented application. The instrumentor instruments function call, branch, load,
and store instructions with code to emit events to the execution trace and to manage
taint items. For all other types of operations in the program, the instrumentor uses a
static taint analysis to determine which operations should be instrumented with code
to emit an event to the dynamic taint trace.
* Function Call. The instrumentor instruments each function call instruction
in the application with code that records a function call event to the execution
trace. The instrumentation code also transfers taint items for the caller's ar-
guments to the callee's parameters and transfers the taint item for the callee's
return value to the caller.
* Branch. The instrumentor instruments each branch instruction in the appli-
cation with code that records a branch event to the execution.
* Load. The instrumentor instruments each load instruction in the application
with a read barrier. The read barrier transfers the taint item for the contents
of the load's source memory address to the load's destination operand.
* Store. The instrumentor instruments each store instruction in the application
with a write barrier. The write barrier transfers the taint item for the store's
source operand to the contents of store's destination memory address.
Static Taint Analysis
To record the dynamic the taint trace, the instrumentor must insert instrumentation
code at each operation in the program that may be tainted by the input. At runtime,
the instrumentation code takes the union of the operation's inputs and creates a new
taint set for the operation's output.
In a naive implementation, the instrumentor could instrument every operation in
the program. However, this approach would lead to unnecessary overhead for opera-
tions that are never tainted by the input. For example, programs compiled without
optimization may store the results of many constant operations; these operations are
never tainted by the input and, therefore, do not need to be instrumented. This
technique would also lead to unnecessary overhead for operations that are tainted by
the same regions of input. Many of the operations in a single function can be tainted
by the same regions of input. A naive instrumentor would create new taint sets for
each of these operation when, in fact, each operation could share a single taint set.
For each function, the instrumentor uses a static analysis to identify the set of
local taint sources that taint each operation in the function. A function's local taint
sources consist of the function's parameters, return values from any function calls,
and values loaded from pointers to memory. The instrumentor uses these sets as
follows:
* If an operation is not tainted by a local taint source, then the instrumentor does
instrument the operation.
* If two operations are tainted by the same local taint sources, then the instrumen-
tor will reuse one operation's taint set as the taint set for the other operation.
The taint analysis calculates the set of local taint sources that affect an operation
with an intra-procedural dataflow analysis. The taint analysis does not propagate
taint through control flow or pointer arithmetic operations. Therefore, the taint
analysis does not track control or indirect data dependencies. Section 5.4 discusses
the effects of ignoring control and indirect dependencies on Chaos's classifications.
4.1.4 Runtime
In addition to an instrumentor, the Execution Monitor also contains a runtime. The
runtime consolidates the majority of the logic required to access and manage the
execution trace and the dynamic taint trace. Each fragment of instrumentation code
typically contains at least one call into the runtime. The runtime is instrumentor-
oblivious and could be used to support instrumentors built upon other instrumen-
tation frameworks, such Valgrind [23], Pin [21], and DynamoRIO [5]. The runtime
provides the Execution Monitor with the following components:
* Trace Manager. The Execution Monitor uses a trace manager to insert events
into the execution trace and the dynamic taint trace.
* Shadow Registers. The Execution Monitor uses shadow registers to store
taint items for the machine registers of the application.
* Shadow Memory. The Execution Manager uses a shadow memory to store
taint items for each memory address in the application.
* Shadow Stack. The Execution Monitor uses a shadow stack to maintain taint
items for each frame in the application's call stack.
* Shadow File System. The Execution Monitor uses the shadow file system to
automatically identify the external inputs to the application.
* Library Shim. The Execution Monitor uses a library shim to intercept calls
to C standard library functions.
The following sections discuss the design, implementation, and use of each of the
runtime's components.
Trace Manager
At its core, the trace manager maintains a large buffer of events. The trace manager
provides an API that allows the Execution Monitor to add function call, branch, and
dynamic taint events to the buffer. As the Execution Monitor adds events to the
buffer, the trace manager first serializes and compacts the buffer. The trace manager
then directs the buffer either to disk or to one of Chaos's analysis components (e.g.
the Input Specification Generator). Section 4.1.5 discusses how Chaos directs the
execution trace and the dynamic taint trace to its analysis components.
Shadow Registers and Shadow memory
For each operation the program, the Execution Monitor must track the taint items
for the operation's inputs and outputs. The Execution Monitor uses shadow registers
to hold taint items for inputs and outputs that reside in machine registers. The
Execution Monitor uses shadow memory to hold taint items for inputs and outputs
that reside in memory.
Shadow Stack
The Execution Monitor must be able to mimic the call stack behavior of an appli-
cation. More specifically, applications compiled for LLVM may use the call stack to
preserve registers, pass arguments, and receive a return value when the application
makes a function call. Similarly, the Execution Monitor uses a shadow stack to pre-
serve taint items for the machine registers, pass taint items for the arguments to a
function call, and receive the taint item for the return value of a function call.
Shadow File system
The Execution Monitor uses the shadow file system to automatically identify the ap-
plication's external inputs. The shadow file system provides a mechanism to intercept
calls to the following UNIX file system calls:
* open: serves an application's request to open a file; open takes a filename as
a parameter and returns a unique handle as a result. On call to open the
Execution, Monitor allocates a taint object that identifies the opened file as a
source of external input to the application.
* read: serves an application's request to read an opened file; read takes a handle
to a file, an integer that indicates the number of bytes to read from the file,
and a pointer to a memory buffer in which to store the bytes from the file. On
a call to read, the Execution Monitor first determines which taint object the
handle represents. The Execution Monitor then inserts a sequence of taint tags
into the shadow memory at the address of the memory buffer; the sequence of
taint tags corresponds to the sequence of offsets for the bytes that were read
from the file.
* write: serves an application's request to write to an opened file; write takes
a handle to a file, an integer that indicates the number of bytes to write to the
file, and a pointer to a memory buffer that gives the source of the bytes to write
to the file. On a call to write, the Execution Monitor reads the taint items
from the shadow memory location of the memory buffer and records that the
taint items were outputted by the application.
* mmap: serves an application's request to map a file to a region of memory; mmap
takes a handle to a file, an integer that indicates the number of bytes to map,
and an address at which to map the file. mmap can also generate a mapping
address if one is not passed as a parameter. On a call to mmap, the Execution
Monitor inserts a sequence of taint tags into the shadow memory at the mapping
address; the sequence of taint tags corresponds to the sequence of file offsets
that were mapped.
Library Shiming
To gain a complete representation of the behavior of the application, the Execution
Monitor must be able to observe the entire execution trace and dynamic taint trace
of an application. Though the Execution Monitor instruments every function in the
application's source, an application may invoke functions in a support library for
which the source is not available. In the case of the C standard library, the runtime
provides the Execution Monitor with a suite of functions that emulate the execution
trace and dynamic taint trace of several functions. For example, the runtime provides
emulations for memcpy and memset.
4.1.5 Architecture
Recording the execution trace and dynamic taint trace of an application imposes a
significant overhead on the execution of an application. For one of the benchmarks
presented Chapter 5, a complete run of Chaos, which includes the Fuzzer, required
500 monitored runs of the application. The execution trace and dynamic trace of an
short-running application (i.e. one to five seconds) can be tens of megabytes in size.
Therefore, a complete run of Chaos can generate multiple gigabytes of data.
Writing these execution traces and dynamic taint traces to disk would consume
a large amount of disk space and, more importantly, bottleneck the execution of the
application to the performance of the computer's I/O system. Instead, the Execution
Monitor implements a modular, streaming architecture. The Execution Monitor's
architecture specifies that any consumer of an execution trace or a dynamic taint
trace be given as a module to the system. During the execution of an application, the
Execution Monitor will then dynamically stream execution trace events and dynamic
taint trace events to the given modules. This architecture provides two performance
improvements :
* I/O performance: in this architecture, the Execution Monitor need not write
traces to disk because these traces can be kept in memory.
* Concurrency: On a multi-core machine, this architecture reduces the overhead
of execution monitoring and analysis by allowing analysis modules to run con-
currently with the application. Chaos also uses this architecture to concurrently
monitor and analyze multiple inputs.
The following sections describe each of Chaos's analysis components. Each com-
ponent is a module in the Execution Monitor's architecture.
4.2 Input Specification Generator
The Input Specification Generator infers a specification of the semantic fields of the
input. This input specification provides the Fuzzer with an effective mechanism to
reduce the search space of possible inputs. More precisely, the input specification en-
ables the Fuzzer to generate inputs by perturbing multiple bytes at a time (as opposed
to perturbing a single byte at a time). This is not possible without a specification
because perturbing bytes that belong to multiple semantic fields will cause Chaos to
report inaccurate classifications.
The Input Specification Generator uses the heuristic that if two adjacent bytes
appear together in operations of the program, then the two bytes should be grouped
into the same field.
Let Oi denote the set of operations affected by byte i of the input. The Input
Specification determines this set by inspecting the dynamic taint trace generated by
the Execution Monitor. For two adjacent bytes in the input, i and j, let Pij, the
probability that byte i and byte j belong to the same field, be given by the Hamming
distance between their sets of affected operations:
I O A ojPi -= (4.1)
This heuristic derives from the observation that bytes from the same field will
affect the same operations in the execution of the program. Heuristics based on refer-
ence locality fail to capture fields that are not accessed sequentially. For instance, ap-
plications with large, compressed data fields in their inputs have highly non-sequential
access patterns; these applications intersperse accesses to the field with accesses to
compression tables. On the other hand, this heuristic does not accurately infer fields
with bytes that do not affect the same operations. For example, this heuristic will
not infer that a null-terminated string is a single field. However, for the benchmarks
and results presented in Chapter 5, this shortcoming is not a problem in practice.
4.3 Fuzzer
The Field Classifier's ability to determine control and payload distinctions depends
on the Fuzzer's ability to systematically explore the behavior of the application. As
discussed in Chapter 2, Chaos first establishes a baseline for the behavior of an
application by monitoring the behavior of the application as it executes on the original
input. Chaos then explores the behavior of an application by using a Fuzzer to create
a suite of similar inputs. Chaos then observes the behavior of the application for
each of the similar inputs. This approach relies on the Fuzzer's ability to generate
perturbed inputs that exercise different behaviors in the application.
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The Fuzzer uses the Input Specification Generator's specification to reduce the
search space of perturbed inputs. For each field in the specification, the Fuzzer creates
a new perturbed input by selecting a new value for the field. The Fuzzer samples
values for the field randomly. This technique is know as random fuzzing.
Random fuzzing may not find values that trigger new behaviors. As discussed
in Section 5.4, random fuzzing will not likely produce a behavior if the behavior is
triggered by only a small number of values in the entire domain of values for a field.
To address this issue, the Fuzzer first selects an extremal value for a field. An extremal
value is a value with all its bits set to zero or one. Extremal values have been shown
to push applications towards outlier behaviors [13].
4.4 Field Classifier
As described in Section 3.4, the Field Classifier classifies each field in the input specifi-
cation along two dimensions: control or payload and critical or benign. Section 4.4.1
discusses how the Field Classifier classifies each field as either control or payload.
Section 4.4.2 describes how the Field Classifier classifies each field as either critical
or benign.
4.4.1 Classification of Control and Payload Fields
As described in Chapter 1, Chaos classifies input fields that heavily influence the
behavior of the program as control; input fields that do not heavily influence the
behavior the program are payload. For each field in the input specification, the Field
Classifier uses the behavioral distance between the execution of the application on
the original input and the execution of the application on an input with a perturbed
value for the field to quantify how much a field influences the behavior of the program.
For a run of the application, i, let Bi denote the set of executed basic blocks. The
Field Classifier determines this set by inspecting the branch events of the execution
trace. Let Dij, the behavioral distance between runs i and j of the application, be
given by the Hamming distance between the two sets of basic blocks:
D. - (4.2)
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Although Hamming distance makes no considerations for the sequence in which the
basic blocks were executed, the results presented in Chapter 5 prove that Hamming
distance effectively identifies large changes in the behavior of the application.
After computing the behavioral distance for each field of the input specification,
the Field Classifier uses hierarchical agglomerative clustering to cluster the fields
based on their behavioral distance.
Hierarchical agglomerative clustering is a well-known clustering technique[30]
The hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm first assigns each field to its own
cluster. The Field Classifier adds an additional dummy field that has a behavioral
distance of 0. The algorithm then iteratively merges clusters that are close together.
This iterative process produces a dendrogram, or binary tree, where each node of the
tree represents a cluster that was produced during the merging process. Each leaf
node represents a cluster containing a single field while the root node represents a
cluster containing all the fields. The Field Classifier selects the two children of the
root node as its control and payload field clusters. Input fields that are grouped into
the same cluster as the dummy field are classified as payload while input fields in the
other cluster are classified as control.
4.4.2 Classification for Critical and Benign Fields
As described in Section 3.4, the Field Classifier classifies fields that contribute heavily
to the output of the application as critical; fields that do not contribute heavily to
the output of the application are benign.
As discussed in Section 5.4, the contents of control fields do not, in general, con-
tribute directly to the operations involved in the computation of the output. Instead,
their contribution to the output is captured by the control dependencies of the ap-
plication. Because the Execution Monitor does not track control dependencies, the
Field Classifier cannot directly calculate their contribution to the output. However,
the results presented in Chapter 5 indicate that large changes in the behavior of
the program typically do lead to large changes in the output. Therefore, the Field
Classifier classifies all control fields critical.
For each payload field in the input specification, the Field Classifier uses output
dependence to estimate a field's contribution to the output of an application. The
Field Classifier determines output dependence by inspecting the dynamic taint trace.
The Field Classifier classifies all payload fields that have a output dependence greater
than .1 as critical. Payload fields with a output dependence less than .1 are classified
as benign.
4.5 Code Classifier
The Code Classifier classifies each executed basic block in the application. The Code
Classifier inspects the dynamic taint trace of the application to determine which
basic blocks in the application reference which fields of the input. For each basic
block, the Code Classifier collects the field classifications for the fields that the basic
block references. Basic blocks that reference fields of a single, dominant classification
are given that dominate classification. Blocks that do not have a single, dominate
classification are classified as mixed usage.
Chapter 5
Evaluation
As described in Chapter 1, Chaos takes an application and an input to the application
and produces the following:
* An input specification that groups the bytes of the flat, binary input into se-
mantic fields.
* For each field in the specification, a classification of whether that field is critical
or benign to the behavior and output of the application.
* For each executed block of code in the application, a classification of whether
that block is critical or benign to the behavior and output of the application.
This section provides an experimental evaluation of the quality of Chaos's field
and code classifications for five benchmarks. To evaluate the quality of these clas-
sifications, I performed an experiment to compare the quality of Chaos's automated
classifications to the classifications of an application-specific test oracle. For each
benchmark, I derived the classifications of the application-specific test oracle as fol-
lows:
1. I ran the system over five inputs to produce field and code classifications.
2. For each input, I generated n new perturbed inputs where each input differs at
a single byte. I then ran the application on the n perturbed inputs to produce
n perturbed outputs.
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3. For each perturbed output, I used the application-specific test oracle to deter-
mine how much the perturbed output differs from the original, unperturbed
output. The test oracle takes the unperturbed output and a perturbed output
and produces a metric that describes the distortion between the two outputs.
For this experiment, I used a normalized Hamming distance calculation on the
bytes of the two outputs. This metric is a value on the interval [0, 1]; 0 means
that the two outputs are identical and 1 means that the outputs differ at all
bytes.
4. I set a distortion threshold of .1 and classified all bytes with a distortion above
the threshold to be critical.
To compare the quality of Chaos's field classifications, I check the number of clas-
sifications on which Chaos and the application-specific test oracle agree. Section 5.1
discusses the benchmarks used in the experiment, Section 5.2 discusses the classifica-
tion results for each benchmark's fields, and Section 5.3 discusses the classifications
results for each benchmark's code.
5.1 Benchmarks
name description size
libjpeg image file format 35 KLOC
libpng image file format 25 KLOC
giflib image file format 5 KLOC
imlib2 image manipulation library 39 KLOC
zlib compression file format 11 KLOC
Table 5.1: Benchmarks
Table 5.1 lists the benchmarks considered for evaluation. The PNG, JPEG, and
GIF benchmarks are 3 widely used image file formats. The zlib benchmark is a widely
used compression library that is the basis of PNG's image compression. The imlib2
image manipulation library gives me a common interface with which to exercise the
behavior of an example program over each image file format. The example program
critical control critical payload benign payloadbenchmark
correct missed correct missed correct missed
png 1458 0 8122 18 451 5
gif 54 5 6897 1412 2149 18
jpeg 695 0 4428 1831 542 27
Table 5.2: Byte classifications for image benchmarks
for this experiment takes an input image and converts it to the bitmap file format
(BMP). Using a common front-end across multiple benchmarks allows me to also
report Chaos's classifications for the code within the front-end (Section 5.3.4)
5.2 Field Classifications
Table 5.2 presents Chaos's results for determining the critical control, critical payload,
and benign payload classifications for each benchmark. As discussed in Section 5.4,
Chaos currently does not make a distinction between critical and benign control fields;
Chaos marks all control fields as critical. A manual inspection of the inputs available
for test revealed that none of the inputs had benign control fields. Therefore, I do
not report the results for this classification as it is not applicable.
Under each classification type listed in in Table 5.2, there are two columns. The
first column, labeled "correct", presents the number of bytes on which Chaos's clas-
sification agreed with that of the test oracle. The second column, labeled "missed",
presents the number of bytes on which Chaos's classification did not agree with that
of the test oracle.
In general, Chaos performs well on critical control and benign payload classi-
fication. Chaos's accuracy for critical payload bytes is significantly lower than its
accuracy for critical control and benign payload bytes. As discussed in Section 4.4,
Chaos classifies an input field as critical if, according to the dynamic taint trace, it
affects more than 10% of the operations in the calculation of the output. However,
the accuracy of this classification scheme depends on how the program computes
the output. For example, the JPEG benchmark uses bytes of the input in pointer
arithmetic (i.e. array accesses). Because Chaos does not track the indirect data
dependencies induced by pointer arithmetic, the output dependence calculation for
these bytes underestimates the contribution of these bytes to the output. Therefore,
Chaos incorrectly classifies 30% of JPEG's critical payload bytes as benign.
Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7, depict the test oracle distortion, behavioral distance,
and output dependence for the PNG benchmark. Figures 5-8, 5-9, and 5-10, and
Figures 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13 present the same for the GIF and JPEG benchmarks,
respectively. A comparison of the graphs for each benchmark reveals how Chaos's
uses behavioral distance and output dependence to model different aspects of the test
oracle's observed distortion .
* Test Oracle Distortion: The first graph in each series plots test oracle distortion
on the y-axis as a function of the position of the corresponding perturbed input
byte on the x-axis. In these graphs, each region of the input exhibits one of the
following types of distortion:
1. Complete Distortion: the program either produces no output or an output
that is different at all bytes. In these regions, test oracle distortion equals
one.
2. Partial Distortion: the program produces an output that is different at
some, but not all, bytes. In these regions, test oracle distortion is greater
than zero but less than one.
3. No Distortion: the program produces exactly the same output. In these
regions, test oracle distortion is zero.
Chaos's uses behavioral distance and output dependence to model complete
distortion, partial distortion, and no distortion.
* Behavioral Distance: The second graph in each series plots the magnitude in
behavioral change observed by Chaos on the y-axis as a function of the position
of the corresponding perturbed input byte on the x-axis. These graphs validate
the three hypotheses about application behavior that motivated Chaos's design:
1. The behavioral space of an application is bifurcated between large and small
deviations in the behavior of the application. In each graph, there is a large
gap in the behavioral distance between regions of high behavioral distance
(greater than .4) and regions of low behavioral distance (less than .4).
2. Large deviations in the behavior of an application lead to large deviations
in the output. For every region of the input with a behavioral distance
greater than .4, the test oracle observes a near-complete distortion of at
least .9 (90% of the output's bytes are different). Chaos classifies these
regions as critical control.
3. Behavioral distance does not account for all distortion. In each graph, there
is large range of the input over which the program does not behave differ-
ently, but the test oracle still observes partial distortion. Chaos classifies
these regions as payload and then uses output dependence to determine if
they are critical or benign.
* Output dependence: The third graph in each series plots output dependence as
a function of each byte in the file. With the exception of the JPEG benchmark,
test oracle distortion directly correlates with output dependence in regions of
the input where the test oracle observes partial distortion but the application
does not behave differently. If Chaos observes that output dependence of an
input region exceeds .1, then Chaos classifies that region as critical payload.
Otherwise, Chaos classifies the region as benign payload because it neither
influences the behavior nor the output of the application.
In general, Chaos uses an accurate and intuitive model of test oracle distortion to
classify fields. A critical control classification means that the application's behavior
and output critically depend on the value of the field. A critical payload classification
means that the field does not influence the behavior of the application but the quality
of the output critically depends on the value of the field. A benign payload classi-
fication means that neither the application's behavior nor the quality of the output
depends on the field.
5.3 Code Classifications
Chaos provides a critical control, critical payload, or benign payload classification for
each basic block of an application. To investigate the validity of these classifications
for my benchmarks, I performed a manual inspection of each executed function to
determine if there was a single classification for each of its blocks. If a function had a
mixture of classifications among its blocks, I recorded that function as "mixed usage."
In general, Chaos's code classifications are correct and each classification attaches a
distinct behavioral role to each function.
* Critical Control: functions that maintain the application's data structures or
select which features of the application to invoke.
* Critical Payload: functions that directly compute the output.
* Benign Payload: functions that implement irrelevant functionality; these func-
tions do not affect the final output of the application.
* Mixed Usage: functions that are used as utilities in the program. These func-
tions appear in multiple contexts and, in each context, touch a different type of
data.
Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 discuss concrete examples of Chaos's code classi-
fications for each benchmark.
5.3.1 PNG and zlib
Critical Control: Figure 5-1(a) lists the PNG and zlib functions that Chaos clas-
sified as critical control. The functions prefixed by png_handle and png_set each im-
plement a particular feature of the specification. png_handle_IHDR, and png_get_IHDR,
read a PNG file format's initial, mandatory header and allocate the library's initial
data structures. The png_handle_PLTE, png_set_PLTE, and png_expand_palette
functions allocate and build the palette for a paletted image. For both the header
and palette functions, if any data corruption occurs, the function will be unable to
function name
png-memcpycheck
png_handle_IHDR
png-setIHDR
png_get IHDR
pngreadimage
png_do _expand _palette
png_doread_transformations
png_doreadfiller
png_handle_PLTE
png-set_PLTE
pngset_tRNS
pnghandletRNS
png_handletRNS
png.read_startrow
png.readfilterrow
(a) Critical Control
function name
pngset_tIME
png_handle_tlME
png_handle_gAMA
png_set_gAMA
pngsetgAMAfixed
pngreadend
pngset_pHys
pnglhandle_IEND
png_handle_pHYs
(c) Benign Payload
Figure 5-1: PNG and
function name
inflate_table
inflatefast
inflate
pngreadrow
png_readfinishrow
updatewindow
(b) Critical Payload
function name
pngcrc_read
png_crc_error
png_get_uint_31
png_read_data
png_default-read_data
png_check_chunkname
png_readchunk_header
(d) Mixed Usage
zlib code classifications
continue in processing the input. png_memcpy_check uses critical data about the
length of various fields to allocate memory buffers. Corruptions to the data that
flows to png_memcpy_check may violate implicit invariants about the intended size
of the allocated buffer and lead to uninitialized reads or out of bounds writes.
Critical Payload: Figure 5-1(b) lists the PNG and zlib functions that Chaos classi-
fied as critical payload. These functions are responsible for decompressing the image's
main content. png_read_row and png_read_finish_row direct compressed image
data from the input file to zlib's inflate_table, inf late_fast, and inflate func-
tions. These functions touch little control data and spend the majority of their time
function name function name
DGifGetLine DGifDecompressLine
DGifGetImageDesc DGifDecompressInput
(a) Critical Control (b) Critical Payload
function name
DGifGetWord
(c) Mixed Usage
Figure 5-2: GIF code classifications
funneling and uncompressing raw payload data. These functions are critical because
the entirety of the application's output is directed through these functions. Therefore,
small errors in these functions can lead to global perturbations in the output.
Benign Payload: Figure 5-1(c) lists the PNG and zlib functions that Chaos clas-
sified as benign payload. These functions implement optional functionality in the
specification. The example program requires a very small portion of the total func-
tionality offered by the PNG library. Because of this, timestamps (png_set_tiME and
png_handle_tlME) and physical device parameters (png_set_pHys) neither change
the behavior of the example program nor effect changes in the output. Faults in
these regions of code will not compromise the output of the program provided that
the program can still execute through the fault. png_read_end and png_handle_IEND
handle the final, delimiting end chunk. Though the PNG specification mandates that
a PNG file be delimited by an end chuck, the PNG library will still return an output
if reaches the end of the input and does not find an end chunk.
Mixed Usage: Figure 5-1(d) lists the PNG and zlib functions that had a mix-
ture of classifications. These functions are common utility functions. The PNG
library computes a checksum for every chunk in the PNG data stream. Therefore,
pngcrcread and png_crcerror, which are responsible for checksum checking, will
touch every piece of data in the input. png_read_data, png_default_read_data,
and png_get_uint_31 are file reading utility functions.
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5.3.2 GIF
Figure 5-2 lists the code classifications for the GIF benchmark. Chaos reports a small
number of functions for the GIF benchmark because it is a simple format that does
not provide the same level of extensibility as PNG and JPEG. GIF's critical control
functions are responsible for parsing the image description header and coordinating
the movement of uncompressed output to destination buffers. Both of these tasks
require manipulating the critical data associated with the image's dimensions and
encoding. Like the PNG file format, GIF's decompression functions are critical pay-
load and faults in these areas will lead to corruptions in the entire image. GIF's single
mixed usage function is a utility function that reads raw bytes from the input.
5.3.3 JPEG
Chaos's classifications for the JPEG library mirrors the results of its analysis for
the PNG library. Figure 5-3 shows that critical control data tends to flow to func-
tions that implement functionality related to either the structure of the input or the
initialization of data structures and processing parameters. allocate_large and
allocate_sarray use the image dimensions to allocate buffers for decompression.
j initdmain_controller initializes the state of parsing engine. In several locations
in the library, jdiv_round_up is used to round off the image's dimensions. JPEG's
critical payload functions are related to decoding and performing image transforma-
tions. These functions serve a similar role to the decompression functions found in
GIF and PNG and can, similarly, globally perturb the output if they encounter a
fault. JPEG's mixed usage code is dedicated to navigating the structure of a JPEG
file. These functions touch most of the structural information in the file and also
touch large regions of benign data.
5.3.4 imlib2
Figure 5-4 lists the few imlib2 functions used by the example program. To load
an image, imlib2 dynamically loads a parsing module for the image format. The
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(a) Critical Control
function name
examine_app0
examine_appl4
(c) Benign Payload
function name
alloclarge
allocsarray
allocsmall
free_pool
jpeg_calc_output _dimensions
jinit_dmain_controller
start_pass_huff_decoder
process_data_simple-main
jpegfinish_decompress
jpegmake_d_derived_tbl
jdivround_up
start_input_pass
start_pass_merged_upsample
start_pass_upsample
consume-markers
jinit master_decompress
jinit merged_upsampler
jinit_upsampler
function name
get_interesting_appn
next _marker
read_markers
skipinput_data
skip_variable
(d) Mixed Useage
Figure 5-3: JPEG code classifications
module delegates the majority of the image loading work to the format's reference
implementation. As a result, the example program exercises only a few of imlib2's
functions. imlib_LoadImage is the main API function used to load images. It is
critical control because it checks certain validity constraints on the image and if
these checks fail, the program produces no output. The load, WriteleByte, save,
and imlibimagequery_pixel functions all reference a combination of critical and
payload data. imlibimage query_pixel obtains a mixed use classification because
it uses control data to index into the input's critical payload data.
function name
decode-mcu
jpeghuffdecode
jpegfill_bit_buffer
jpegidctislow
(b) Critical Payload
function name
function name load
imlibLoadlmage WriteleByte
WriteleLong save
(a) Critical Control imlib-imagequerypixel
(b) Mixed Useage
Figure 5-4: Imlib2 code classifications
5.4 Discussion
This section discusses a number of the issues and limitations of my experimental
methodology and the quality of Chaos's classifications. The experimental method-
ology I adopted is designed to present Chaos's classifications about application-
specification behavior as objectively as possible. The quality of Chaos's classifications
depends on a number of limitations in its technical components. These limitations are
due to a need to find a trade-off between engineering effort and classification quality
for a number of technical problems that are in active areas of research.
5.4.1 Methodology
Multimedia binary formats maintain well-defined specifications that give precise de-
scriptions of file structures, data types, and supported features. While these spec-
ifications are concise, their interpretation within a particular application may be
ambiguous. As shown in the results for my benchmarks, an application may ignore
parts of a specification that have no meaning within the application's context. In the
presence of application-specific interpretations of a standardized format, automati-
cally checking the quality of Chaos's distinctions against a known standard would be
unreasonable as the result of such an experiment would be subject to the application's
interpretation of the standard. Instead, I have adopted a methodology that checks
Chaos's classifications against an application-specific test oracle.
5.4.2 Benchmark Selection
The PNG, GIF, and JPEG file formats are interesting benchmarks to study because
the reference implementations for these file formats will, in certain circumstances,
ignore the inconsistencies of an input and still generate an output. While the quality
of this output is entirely dependent on the nature and location of the inconsistency,
these applications allow me to investigate a wide range of their behaviors. Some
applications, on the other hand, are designed to not tolerate input inconsistencies.
For instance, many binary format implementations use checksums to guard against
data corruption. If an implementation chooses to not generate an output if the input's
checksum is inconsistent, then Chaos will report that every field of the input is critical
control. While this classification is correct, these implementations would not allow
me to explore critical and benign payload behaviors.
5.4.3 Input Specification Coverage
Due to the nature of dynamic analysis, the experimental results only hold for the
set of inputs considered for the experiment. In particular, judging the quality of
inference for input-driven approaches requires a notion of input specification coverage
and program code coverage. To address this issue, all inputs for the experiments are
taken from a custom-built, automated web spider. This spider crawls the internet
looking for files of the specified formats. When the spider finds a candidate input, it
computes a content hash and a structural hash. The content hash encodes the exact
content of the image and allows the spider to quickly filter identical images. The
spider computes the structural hash by parsing the input and hashing the input's
parse tree. To ensure that no two inputs exercise the exact same path through the
system, I chose each input for the experiment to have a different structural hash.
5.4.4 Random Fuzzing
Chaos's ability to identify large changes in the behavior of the application relies on the
Fuzzer's ability to generate inputs. One of the main drawbacks of random fuzzing is
its inability to quickly and reliably enumerate the entire input domain. While Chaos
uses automatic field identification to reduce the search space of all possible inputs,
it is still subject to random fuzzing's inability to efficiently find rare behaviors. For
instance, if a system has a behavior that occurs only if a particular 32-bit integer
in the input is one of k values, then random fuzzing has a k chance of producing
that value. Incorporating a smart concolic tester, such as Klee, SAGE, or SmartFuzz,
would allow Chaos to enumerate these rare conditions more quickly [7, 16, 22].
5.4.5 Lack of Output Dependence Distancing
Chaos currently determines a field's output dependence classification from the execu-
tion log of the original, unperturbed input. However, this technique does not account
for the fact that perturbing a field may induce large changes in the composition of
the output. Namely, a change to a field may mean that a different part of the input
is used to compute the output. Dynamic taint tracing imposes a significant overhead
on top of basic execution monitoring. For a file of length n, if Chaos is configured
to take k samples for each field and the input specification generates a poor field
specification, then Chaos may need to execute k x n inputs. Recording and running
this many examples is slow with dynamic taint tracing enabled. Therefore, in the in-
terest of performance, Chaos does not run dynamic taint tracing on perturbed inputs.
This decision precludes an output dependence distancing algorithm that can better
estimate how drastically the output composition changes. For compressed images,
such an algorithm would better capture the existence of indirect dependences that
are induced by tainted pointer computations.
5.4.6 Stateless Behavioral Distancing
As described in Section 4.4.1, Chaos uses a Hamming distance metric on the set of
executed blocks to compute the behavioral distance between two executions. Ham-
ming distance weighs behavioral distance by code size and does not account for the
order in which blocks are executed. While Chaos shows that this can be a good ap-
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Chapter 6
Related Work
The distinction between critical and benign regions of an application and its input
has long been recognized by researchers. Rinard et al. conducted a study of two
applications to determine the applications' forgiving and unforgiving regions [28].
The forgiving regions of an application are regions of the application's code in which
the application can tolerate errors. The unforgiving regions of an application are
regions of the application's code in which the application cannot tolerate errors. In
their study, the researchers used software fault injection to simulate faults in a video
player and an email client. The researchers found that the forgiving regions of the
applications corresponded to regions of code that handled the image contents of the
video or the text contents of an email. The unforgiving regions of the applications
corresponded to regions of code that manipulated the metadata of the video and
email. For instance, the researchers observed that a fault inserted into the code that
handles the metatdata of a video caused the video player to completely lose track of
its place in the input stream.
Pattabiraman et al. have developed Samurai, an implementation of a novel mem-
ory model called critical memory [26]. Critical memory separates a program's heap
into two conceptual heaps: a critical heap and non-critical heap. The critical heap
contains objects that are critical to the functionality of the application. A non-critical
heap contains objects that are not critical to the functionality of the application.
Samurai provides programmers with an explicit API to manually allocate objects in
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the critical heap. Samurai then uses object replication and error-correction guard
objects allocated in the critical heap from memory corruption.
In their analysis of the utility of the critical memory abstraction, Pattabiraman
conducted an experiment in which they compared the failure rate of an application
compiled with and without Samurai. In the presence of memory corruptions to critical
data, the version of the application built without Samurai suffered failure rates in
excess of 50% while the version compiled with Samurai had a failure rate of 0. In the
presence of memory corruptions to non-critical data, the application suffered failure
rates of approximately 2%. This experiment confirmed their hypothesis that certain
pieces of data are more critical to the functionality of the application than others.
Both of these research projects confirm that there exists both critical and non-
critical behaviors in an application. Namely, there are regions of code and data on
which an application's behavior and output critically depend and there are regions
of code and data on which an application's behavior and output does not critically
depend. In non-critical regions of data and code, the application can better tolerate
memory corruption and programmer error. Chaos compliments the work done by
these projects in that it is, to my knowledge, the first system to automatically identify
the critical regions of an application's code and inputs.
6.1 Input Specification Inference
A number of researchers in computer systems security are actively working on methods
for automatic input specification inference[6, 20, 8, 9]. These approaches are designed
to produce input specifications for reverse engineering, testing, and intrusion detec-
tion. Like Chaos, these tools use an application's execution trace and dynamic taint
trace to infer a specification of an input.
Chaos's generated input specifications are not as detailed as those provided by
these tools. These tools are designed to generate expressive specifications that de-
scribe nested structures and field alternations. Chaos's specifications are primarily
designed to reduce the search space of fuzzed inputs. Although a more expressive
specification could allow Chaos to explore more behaviors of an application, the re-
sults of this thesis show that Chaos can already identify critical behaviors.
6.2 Fuzzing
Automated fuzz testing has become an effective means for testing programs. A fuzzing
technique can be categorized by the amount of information it needs to know about
the program and its input.
Random blackbox techniques require neither access to the source of the program,
nor a specification of the structure of the input. A random blackbox tester generates
test inputs by either mutating an existing test or generating a test from scratch.
Random blackbox testing is known to be an inefficient technique to generate inputs
because it will generate many structurally or semantically inconsistent inputs that
the application will quickly reject. Random blackbox testing may also generate many
tests that exercise the exact same execution path in the program.
Random block-based blackbox and random grammar-based blackbox fuzzing tech-
niques use an input specification to generate inputs. Block-based fuzzers use a spec-
ification of the blocks, or fields, of an input to reduce the search space of inputs
by fuzzing an input a block at a time[2]. Grammar-based fuzzers use a grammar
that gives a specification of the set of legal inputs to an application. While a block-
based approach will allow the fuzzer to fuzz multiple bytes, or blocks, of an input
at a time, the generated inputs may still have inconsistencies. For example, a block
that specifies the length of another field may be inconsistent with the length of the
other field if the two fields are not fuzzed together. Grammar-based approaches avoid
generating inconsistent inputs by only generating inputs that are, according to the
grammar, legal. However, manually developing a grammar for an application may be
time consuming.
Whitebox fuzzing techniques generate inputs by symbolically executing an appli-
cation; this process requires the source or binary of the application. During symbolic
execution, a whitebox fuzzer collects the set of conditional predicates, or constraints,
that describe each symbolically executed path in the program. A whitebox fuzzer
then solves the set of constraints to produce an input that exercises the path. White-
box fuzzers can achieve high rates of code coverage if one can afford the large expense
of symbolic execution and constraint solving [7, 16, 22, 15].
Other researchers have also proposed hybrid techniques that combine a number
of these techniques [13, 25].
Chaos uses random block-based blackbox fuzzing to generate its suite of perturbed
inputs. This technique provides an easily implementable way for Chaos to explore
the behaviors of an application. Chaos's approach is adequate because Chaos is not
designed to find bugs in applications. Oftentimes, bugs are hidden in the subtle,
fine-grained behaviors of an application. Chaos, instead, seeks to identify critical
control behaviors. As shown in this thesis, these behaviors manifest themselves as
large, coarse changes in the behavior of the application. However, Chaos's design
is amenable to any sufficiently efficient fuzzing technique. In particular, a whitebox
fuzzing technique may allow Chaos to identify fine-grained changes in the behavior
of an application.
6.3 Behavioral Distancing
Security researchers have long investigated the notion that the occurrence of an
anomalous behavior in a large software system can be indicative of an attack on
the system. Researchers have enumerated a number techniques that use execution
monitoring (i.e. system call and system call arguments) to build a model of the nor-
mal behavior of an application. These models range from simple Hamming distance
calculations to stateful, probabilistic models[11, 32, 14, 31, 4].
Software analysis researchers have also used behavioral modeling to find bugs in
applications. The CBI project uses a collaborative community to distribute applica-
tion monitoring over a number of hosts. CBI collects the monitoring information of
each host and then uses statistical analysis to correlate bugs with anomalous behav-
iors in the application[19].
Ammons et al have used the execution traces of library usage to infer specifications
about API usage patterns. A specification is given by a probabilistic finite state
machine that, when given a candidate trace, can determine the probability that the
trace is a valid use of the API. Others have since extended these approaches to infer
fine-grained behavioral patterns in large systems [3, 12].
Chaos's goal differs from the mentioned systems in that it is designed to detect
large behavioral differences rather than model the likely behaviors of a program.
Chaos uses Hamming distance to describe the distance between executions because it
provides an easily implementable technique to identify large changes in behavior. In
contrast, researchers in these other domains need to model small changes in behaviors
because bugs and intrusions are often identified by small changes.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
As discussed in Chapter 1 and shown in Chapter 5, the code and input of a program
can be productively classified along two dimensions: control or payload and critical
or benign.
Regions of critical control code and data are critical to the behavior and output of
the program because errors in these regions can cause the program to invoke incorrect
functionality or crash, producing no output. Regions of critical payload code and
data are critical to the output of the program because errors in these regions can
lead to substantial distortion in the output of the program. In benign control and
payload regions, errors may not cause the program to behave differently or produce
a substantially different output provided that the program an execute through the
error.
Chaos gives developers an automated tool to infer control versus payload and
critical versus benign distinctions for a program's code and input. Developers can
use Chaos's classifications to more quickly identify the source of errors in the pro-
gram and, once found, prioritize fixing errors that are potentially more critical to the
behavior and output of the application. Although researchers and developers have
long understood that some regions of a program and its input are more critical to
the behavior and output of an application, to the best of my knowledge, Chaos is the
first system designed to automatically identify these regions.
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